Gas Town and Bullet Hell

Warning: a collection of half-formed thoughts about time, screens, AI agents, and a surprisingly relevant Japanese arcade genre.


This started with a phrase in Azeem Azhar’s piece about his AI agent workflow: “wall-clock time.”

“Two Timer” clock by Industrial Facility

It’s a term of art in programming: the actual elapsed time on the clock on the wall, as opposed to CPU time or token throughput or any other measure of what the machine is doing internally.

I hadn’t come across it before, despite having spent years thinking about time and technology, and it lodged in my head.

The interesting thing there for me about AI agents isn’t just how much they can do, it’s the growing gap between the machine’s time and the human’s time.

An agent can burn through a hundred million tokens in a day. The wall-clock time for the human supervising it is the same twenty-four hours it always was.

And then the BCG/HBR AI brain fry study landed earlier this month. Workers who oversee multiple AI agents report 33% more decision fatigue, 39% more errors, and a distinctive “buzzing” sensation, a mental fog that participants struggled to name until the researchers gave them one – “Brain Fry”. 14% percent of AI-using workers report this brain fry. In marketing, it’s 26%.

Steve Yegge, who’s been building Gas Town: a multi-agent orchestrator for managing colonies of 20+ parallel AI coding agents – wrote about the same phenomenon a few weeks earlier, in a post he called “The AI Vampire.”

His framing was vivid: AI makes you 10x more productive, but the productivity comes at a cost the industry hasn’t named yet. Yegge described sudden “nap attacks”: collapsing into sleep at odd hours after long vibe-coding sessions — and observed that friends at other AI-native startups were reporting the same thing.

His image was Colin Robinson from What We Do in the Shadows: an energy vampire, sitting on your shoulder, drinking while you (it? both?) code.

The work is exhilarating and draining, simultaneously, because AI automates the easy parts and leaves you with an unbroken stream of hard decisions compressed into the same number of hours.

Both accounts are being framed, mostly, as a UX problem (better dashboards), a training problem (up-skill your people), or a management problem (set limits). All valid?

But it seems to me that something else is going on — something older and more structural — and it has to do with clocks.

Time Machine Go!

There’s a long, rich body of work about what technology does to the experience of time, and I keep coming back to it. (I’ve been circling this for a while — a talk at DxF in Utrecht back in 2009, “All the Time in the World,” about how human cultures construct time and how designers might deconstruct and reconstruct it; the grain of spacetime as a design materialantichronos and the compound nature of time; the notion of chronodynamic design.

But the brain fry study has maybe sharpened something for me.

E.P. Thompson’s “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism” (1967) is the essential starting point. His argument: clock-time is not a natural given. It’s a technology, imposed by the factory system.

Pre-industrial societies worked to task-time — you milked the cow when the cow needed milking, you fished when the tide was right. The mechanical clock and the factory bell imposed a different regime: synchronised, disciplinary, abstract. And crucially, it wasn’t just imposed from above: it was internalised, through schooling, religion, print culture, until it felt like common sense.

James Carey showed how the telegraph extended this further — it could transmit time faster than a train could carry it, which is how we ended up with standardised time zones. The telegraph didn’t just speed up communication; it made wall-clock time universal. And then came the step that I think matters most for where we are now. 

About Time by David Rooney

David Rooney’s About Time traces what happened when precise, synchronised time could be distributed electrically — wired clocks in factories, schools, railway stations, town squares. The Brno electric time system of 1903 is his case study.

Once the infrastructure existed to push accurate time into every public space, clock-discipline stopped being merely an economic requirement and became a moral one.

Punctuality became a virtue. Being on time was being a good citizen, a reliable worker, a decent person. The machinery of timekeeping was internalised so completely that it ceased to look like machinery at all — it looked like character. Electric time could be exported across the industrialised world not just as coordination but as morality.

Carolyn Marvin, in When Old Technologies Were New (1988), demonstrated the same pattern from a different angle: every new medium — telephone, electric light, radio — was received as “new” precisely to the extent that it seemed to annihilate time and distance.

The rhetoric is remarkably consistent across eras.

We’ve been having the same conversation about technology conquering time for about a hundred and fifty years.

So wall-clock time — the time of schedules, meetings, train timetables — was already a technological imposition on older, bodily rhythms.

It’s not the “natural” baseline against which AI’s speed is measured. It’s just the previous generation’s machine. And — per Rooney — it’s not just a machine. It’s a machine that learned to dress up as a moral principle.

But something has shifted. 

Félix Guattari distinguished between human time and machinic time: the former mediated by clocks and institutions, the latter operating at computational speeds that exceed human perception entirely. Hartmut Rosa calls it the “shrinking of the present” — the window in which your past experience reliably predicts the future gets narrower with each acceleration. And Paul Virilio spent decades developing what he called dromology — from the Greek dromos, a racetrack — essentially a science of speed.

Dromology in the DCU: The Speed Force…

His argument was that the history of civilisation is not primarily a history of wealth or territory but of velocity: who controls the fastest, densest barrage controls the territory. Each new speed technology — the stirrup, the railway, the telegraph, the missile, the fibre-optic cable — reshapes not just logistics but perception itself.

Speed doesn’t just let you move more easily; it changes what you can see, hear, and think. Push acceleration far enough and you get what Virilio called the “aesthetics of disappearance” — things moving too fast to be perceived at all. The landscape seen from a bullet train isn’t a landscape anymore; it’s a blur. The high-frequency trade executed in microseconds isn’t a decision anymore; it’s a reflex of infrastructure.

The BCG study’s “buzzing” and “mental fog” sit right in this lineage. Railway passengers in the 1840s reported nervous exhaustion at 30mph — what doctors called “railway spine.

Schivelbusch documented how rail speed literally rewired perception: landscapes became panoramic blurs, attention fragmented, a new kind of fatigue emerged that the medical establishment had no language for. Telegraph operators developed what we’d now recognise as burnout. The body protesting a tempo it didn’t choose.

So maybe, brain fry is the 2026 version of railway spine?

I.E. an embodied protest of a nervous system being asked to run at a tempo it didn’t evolve for.

Brain Fry & Bullet Hell

This came to mind when I was trying to describe the feeling of supervising multiple AI agents to a friend: the way you end up in a state of continuous partial attention, scanning outputs, waiting for something to go wrong, never quite able to look away and I realised the closest analogy I had was danmaku.

For those who haven’t encountered it: danmaku (弾幕, literally “bullet curtain”) is a Japanese arcade genre — sometimes called “bullet hell” — where the screen fills with hundreds of projectiles in elaborate, spiralling patterns. The player’s ship is tiny. The bullets are everywhere. The whole point is overwhelm. Games like TouhouDoDonPachiIkaruga.

Beautiful, punishing, compulsive.

I think Ikaruga was my introduction to them.

Ikaruga

In danmaku, information throughput exceeds conscious processing — you literally cannot track each bullet individually.

The BCG finding that cognitive load spikes after three AI tools describes the same saturation point: too many concurrent streams of machine-speed output for a single human to monitor serially.

Touhou

But – expert danmaku players don’t get faster. They change how they see.

They shift from focused attention (tracking individual bullets) to a kind of peripheral soft-focus — reading patterns, finding the safe channel through the barrage. It’s a perceptual shift, not a speed upgrade. And it leads, reliably, to flow states. Csikszentmihalyi’s sweet spot: challenge meets skill, self-consciousness dissolves, time distorts in the good way. Players describe it as exhilarating.

So: a human being synchronises their nervous system to machinic time, processes hundreds of parallel streams of machine-speed output, and the result is exhilaration.

Meanwhile, another human being supervises three AI agents producing parallel text outputs at roughly the same structural tempo, and the result is brain fry.

Same physics. Opposite feeling.

I think 3 things account for that gap.

First, consent. The danmaku player chooses the machine’s tempo. That’s the game — you opt in. The knowledge worker has it imposed by a productivity mandate. Thompson again: the difference between dancing and marching is who sets the beat. The factory bell and the AI agent notification are structurally identical — both impose a rhythm from outside the body. One is discipline, the other is play, depending entirely on the power relationship.

Second, legibility. Bullets are unambiguous. A bullet is a threat, a gap is safety, the feedback loop is instant and total. AI agent output requires continuous evaluative judgment — is this correct? relevant? hallucinated? — which loads a different, slower cognitive system on top of the tracking task. You’re playing bullet hell, except some of the bullets might be power-ups, but you can’t tell until you stop and read them carefully. Which rather defeats the purpose of the soft-focus.

Third, reversibility. Die in danmaku, you lose a life and restart. The stakes are emotional, not consequential. If I miss a sloppy AI output — a hallucinated fact, a wrong number, an email sent with your name on it — the damage is real, IRL. The fear of consequential failure however small prevents exactly the relaxed alertness that flow requires.

An excursion to The Bullet Farm

There’s an etymological thing here that I find quite evocative.

弾幕 — danmaku — starts as a military term.

A barrage. Suppressive fire. The purpose isn’t to hit specific targets but to make an entire zone impassable.

The word migrates to arcade games in the 1990s, where the screen becomes the impassable zone.

Then it migrates again to Niconico Douga in the 2000s, where it describes the dense scrolling comment overlays that cover the video — thousands of viewer comments streaming across simultaneously. A curtain of text.

Three instances of the same image: a barrage of projectiles, a barrage of pixels, a barrage of words.

And then (this is where it gets a bit more indulgent, but bear with me) there’s George Miller’s Fury Road.

The Bullet Farmer.

One of three warlords controlling essential resources in a post-apocalyptic economy — water, fuel, ammunition.

His power isn’t that he uses the bullets; it’s that he controls their supply. He doesn’t need to aim. He just needs to fill the zone. Dromology again: whoever controls the fastest, densest barrage controls the territory.

It’s not lost on me that Yegge named his multi-agent orchestrator after the Fury Road settlement. Gas Town — the place that refines and distributes fuel.

In Miller’s economy, Gas Town, the Bullet Farm, and the Citadel form a tripartite monopoly on the resources that make movement, violence, and survival possible.

Yegge’s Gas Town manages the fuel supply for AI coding agents — the orchestration layer that keeps the colony of twenty-plus agents running. But the Bullet Farm is maybe the bit nobody’s building yet: the thing that manages the barrage of outputs those agents produce, and the human attention required to survive it.

Think about this in relation to the AI landscape more broadly. The competitive advantage isn’t in any single agent’s output quality — it’s in the sheer volume and speed of the barrage. Flood the workspace with tools, agents, copilots. The worker, like Furiosa, has to find a path through it.

So the word carries four registers: military (suppress movement), ludic (overwhelm as play), communal (overwhelm as shared experience), and political-economic (overwhelm as resource monopoly). Each preserves the core logic — the barrage as design feature, not failure — but the human’s relationship to it changes completely depending on context.

And AI agent oversight is arguably the first context where the barrage is accidental.

Nobody designed multi-agent workflows to feel like bullet hell.

And yet.

The design problem this reveals

If brain fry is a clock problem — a temporal mismatch between human cognition and machinic speed — then solutions that only address interface design or training will help at the margins but miss the structural issue.

Just as telling 1840s railway passengers to “get used to it” didn’t prevent nervous illness.

The danmaku analogy suggests a different set of questions.

If we want AI agent work to feel more like flow and less like fry, the challenge isn’t making things faster or even slower — it’s about legibility, consent, and reversibility, and all three matter at once.

Legibility first: can agent outputs be designed to be scannable as patterns rather than read as individual documents?

Not better summaries — actual visual or structural affordances that let you soft-focus and spot the anomaly, the way a danmaku player spots the gap in the curtain.

Something closer to a radar screen than a text feed.

Then consent: can workers set their own review tempo? Asynchronous handoffs rather than real-time monitoring. What Sarah Sharma calls “temporal sovereignty” — the right to set your own pace.

The BCG data shows that AI reduces burnout when it offloads repetitive work and increases it when it demands oversight. The variable is who controls the clock.

And reversibility: can we lower the stakes of missing something?

Undo, rollback, draft-before-send, human-in-the-loop-but-not-human-as-the-loop. If the consequence of missing a bad output is catastrophic, the nervous system clenches into hypervigilance.

If it’s recoverable, the nervous system can relax into the peripheral awareness that actually works better for this kind of monitoring.

Anyone remember Braid?

Maybe there’s a hybrid of Braid and git that we need.

I keep coming back to Marvin’s insight that technologies are not fixed natural objects but “constructed complexes of habits, beliefs, and procedures embedded in elaborate cultural codes.” The temporal regime of multi-agent AI work isn’t inevitable — it’s being constructed right now, through design choices and management practices and vendor incentives and labour relations. And — this is the Rooney point again — it’s already being moralised.

Not using AI is starting to be framed as if it’s professional negligence. Not keeping up with the agents feels like a personal failing, not a structural mismatch. The Brno electric clock trick is happening again: a new tempo imposed by infrastructure, dressed up as character.

Punctuality was the virtue of the electric age; throughput is the virtue of the agentic one.

Humanity’s final keyboard, source unknown via Ben Mathes

We’ve been here before.

The factory bell, the railway timetable, the telegraph wire, the always-on smartphone — each imposed a new temporal discipline, each produced its own characteristic form of exhaustion, and each was eventually (partially, imperfectly) domesticated through a combination of regulation, design, and collective action.

The question is whether we can do that faster this time.

Or whether — per Rosa’s paradox — acceleration makes the process of adapting to acceleration itself harder. I suspect it’s the latter, but I’d quite like to be wrong.

Let’s see.


Some of the thinking here draws on ThompsonSchivelbuschCareyMarvinRooneyVirilioRosaGuattariCrary, and Sharma — a bibliography of people who’ve been worrying about what machines do to time for rather longer than the current AI discourse might suggest. The BCG/HBR brain fry study is by Bedard, Kropp, Hsu, Karaman, Hawes, and Kellerman. Steve Yegge’s The AI Vampire” and Gas Town are essential reading on the lived experience of multi-agent orchestration.


Colophon: how this was made

It would be dishonest not to mention this, given what the post is about.

Azeem’s piece — the one that started this — was partly authored by his AI agent. So here we are: an agent-assisted post about agent-assisted posts about the experience of working with agents.

Turtles all the way down, etc.

This piece was written with Claude, over the course of a single session. The process went roughly like this: I had a cluster of half-connected thoughts — Azeem’s “wall-clock time” phrase, the BCG brain fry study, Yegge’s AI Vampire, a memory of Carolyn Marvin, the danmaku thing that occurred to me while trying to explain what agent-wrangling feels like, and a book on my shelf I’d been meaning to think harder about (Rooney). I knew there was a thread running through them but I hadn’t pulled it taut.

What Claude did, in machinic time, was the research legwork: finding and synthesising the Thompson-Carey-Virilio-Rosa-Guattari lineage, pulling together the BCG study’s specific data points, confirming citations, searching for connections I suspected existed but hadn’t verified. It produced structured research notes, then a set of blog post ideas, then a draft. Each round took minutes of wall-clock time and involved the kind of parallel literature review that would have taken me days of reading and note-taking.

What I did, in human time, was something different.

I provided the initial constellation of ideas — the specific intellectual connections that felt interesting rather than merely logical. I pushed back on structure and emphasis. I said “does danmaku connect to this?” and “there’s a Bullet Farm in Mad Max” and “what about Rooney’s electric time as morality?” — the sideways moves, the half-remembered things that might or might not be relevant. Honestly at points I felt like a court jester or the class clown in the seminar. I also read drafts with my own sense of voice and rhythm and cut or redirected when it didn’t feel right. The style guide helped here — Claude had a description of how I write, which is a strange thing to hand over, like giving someone your gait analysis and asking them to walk for you.

I don’t think this invalidates the post — if anything, it’s evidence for it. But I wanted to show the working, because it seems important to be honest about the means of production when the means of production are the subject.

The result is something I couldn’t have written this fast alone (or at all?), and something Claude couldn’t have written at all alone — not because it lacks the ability to string sentences together, but because it didn’t have the initial constellation.

It didn’t know that danmaku and the Bullet Farm and Rooney’s Brno clocks belonged in the same thought. Maybe they don’t according to the embedding space.

That pattern-recognition — this goes with this — was the human contribution. The machine contributed speed, breadth, and a tireless willingness to restructure on demand.

Which is, of course, exactly the dynamic the post describes.

I was the player in the bullet hell, trying to maintain soft-focus across the agent’s outputs, steering by feel rather than tracking every token. It was — at various points — exhilarating and a bit draining. Not quite brain fry, but I could see it from where I was sitting.

The temporal mismatch is real: Claude can produce a 3,000-word draft in seconds, and then you spend twenty minutes reading it with the nagging sense that you should be going faster, that you’re the bottleneck, that the machine is waiting.

Rooney’s moralisation of the clock is right there in the room with you. 

Why aren’t you keeping up?

The job of a {broader, more inclusive set of design} brain{s} is to “produce {decolonised} future{s}”

Daniel Dennett, Intuition Pumps (my emboldening, below)

How can meaning make a difference? It doesn’t seem to be the kind of physical property, like temperature or mass or chemical composition, that could cause anything to happen. What brains are for is extracting meaning from the flux of energy impinging on their sense organs, in order to improve the prospects of the bodies that house them and provide their energy. The job of a brain is to “produce future” in the form of anticipations about the things in the world that matter to guide the body in appropriate ways. Brains are energetically very expensive organs, and if they can’t do this important job well, they aren’t earning their keep.

Matt Ward, interviewed by SpeculativeEdu

Colonising the future: If Speculative Design builds competency in thinking about future alternatives, the design community needs to ensure that it is aware of the structural inequalities that allow for a privileged voice. I think it’s become painfully obvious that we don’t need any more white male billionaires telling us how the future looks, therefore by moving Speculative Design outside of the “academy” we need to make sure it’s reaching people who don’t normally have say over the future. We should aim to empower alternative views about how the world could be.

 

It’s a great interview. Read the lot.

Speaking my brains about future brains this year

Got some fun speaking gigs lined up, mainly going to be talking (somewhat obliquely) about my work at Google AI over the last few years and why we need to make centaurs not butlers.

June

August

November

Then I’ll probably shut up again for a few years.

Station Identification

Reading is a technology for perspective-taking. When someone else’s thoughts are in your head, you are observing the world from that person’s vantage point. Not only are you taking in sights and sounds that you could not experience firsthand, but you have stepped inside that person’s mind and are temporarily sharing his or her attitudes and reactions. As we shall see, “empathy” in the sense of adopting someone’s viewpoint is not the same as “empathy” in the sense of feeling compassion toward the person, but the first can lead to the second by a natural route. Stepping into someone else’s vantage point reminds you that the other fellow has a first-person, present-tense, ongoing stream of consciousness that is very much like your own but not the same as your own.

– The Better Angels of Our Nature, Steven Pinker.

Anaesthesia and embodied interaction

Went to the dentist last friday.

I fully comply with the rest-of-the-world’s view of the British relationship with the dental arts, and am completely terrified of going to the little room with the cup of pink rinse.

I asked for recommendations from friends for a dentist who specialised in making people who hadn’t been to the dentist in… a long time… feel more relaxed and happy about the experience.

Mr. Webb told me about his dentist, Dr.Bashar Al-Naher who uses a combination of mild anaesthetic and NLP to induce relaxation and a feeling of security in his patients.

I’ve been lucky enough never to have to have surgery or be in another situation where anaesthesia was employed, so this was a novel experience for me.

Once I’d reached the state of both local and mild general anaesthesia, I had a curious feeling of distance from my body.

I felt as if my conscious mind (in which I seemed together enough to start dissecting the experience) was ‘up on a balcony’ somewhere in my head. I had a distinct feeling that I had retreated to an observation gallery, compartmentalised from my body itself, and even the lower part of my head/face where the action was.

Whilst feeling removed from ‘where the action was’, I started reflecting on ‘Where the action is’, and my previous work with Chris on embodied interaction. I even started thinking about writing this post.

Sometime during this, a small daemon system running somewhere sidled into the balcony where “I” was, and started fretting about all the dissection of the experience I was doing – perhaps fearing the degree of conscious thought going on would let the body (and the pain) in through the back door.

I went back to (un)concentrating on my breathing, and the visualisation that Dr. Al-Naher was leading me through. Happy again, I let the drilling and filling continue…

After the work had been done and I was coming out of the state of anaesthesia I was talking with the dentist, probably quite slowly and deliberately – but definitely ‘back in the room’.

There was a moment where I was aware that my foot was in an uncomfortable or precarious position. Most of the time we wouldn’t give this a microsecond’s conscious thought, and we would just effortlessly readjust the position of our foot.

I felt I had to send a discrete set of instructions down my body to my foot, almost like Flesh-Logo in order to move it.

Of course there are all sorts of flaws with this interpretation, but the temporary compartmentalising of ‘body’ and ‘mind’ that I felt just reinforced the fact that most of the time there is no separation at all.

The experience (apart from making my teeth better) has left me with real conviction the train of thought in Paul Dourish’s book – about the power of embodied interaction to improve our interfaces with technology.

And also, of course, how good my new dentist is – but he probably mindhacked me to say that…

Precisely

Demetri Martin:

“Lately I’ve been waking up at 8:32. The weird thing is that I don’t have an alarm clock. I just open my eyes when I’m done sleeping. It doesn’t matter when I go to sleep, when I wake up and look at my watch it almost always says “8:32.” I’ve been trying to switch up my wake-up style (to get a different time) by waiting a few minutes before I look at my watch. But it’s still 8:32. So, I guess it’s not that I’m necessarily waking up at 8:32. It’s more that I look at my watch for the first time every morning at 8:32. (When I say “almost always” above, I mean 19 out of the last 23 times I’ve woken up in my bed my watch has said “8:32.”) I’m not showing off, I’m just saying that there is something precise about me in the morning.”

Chemical carrots

Monkeymagic has been listening to Dr. Robin Dunbar:

“Dunbar was talking about his new book, The Human Story. One of the ideas in it was that religion, myth and story-telling are cohesive forces – they offer ways to help us make the trade-off between short-term desires and long-term gains, and they oil the wheels in our social machinery.

Religious ecstasy, feeling at one with the (socially constructed) world, and that buzz of being in an audience watching something good all seem to be signs that opiates are beginning to float round our circuitry.

These chemical carrots exist as an aid to group-forming. But here’s the rub. These same carrots might also ensure that the group acts against any individual who might take away their high. The bigger the high, the bigger the aggression.”

The internet must be such a great petri dish for scientists like Dr. Dunbar. I met him once at a Cap-Gemini event examining how religions are built, but I forgot to ask him if he took note of online groupthink and flamewars.

» MonkeyMagic: The Flipside of the Collective is War.

Lifegame

The Guardian interviews people on their experience of Improbable Theatre’s Lifegame, “in which a show is improvised around an interviewee’s life story”

“In some cases, Improbable’s versions of my memories have almost replaced my actual memories: the way they did my mother singing around the house; the way they described how I came to read drama at university, creating puppets out of newspaper. They asked me how I would like to die; it wasn’t something I had particularly thought about, but I said dying on a limestone ridge in the Mediterranean would suit me fine. Now every time I go on holiday and go walking on high limestone ridges, I remember their depiction of that scene. “

If someone tells a better story of your life to strangers than the one you actually lived, it may lodge itself in the spotless mind…

The philosopher and the thermostat

dennett.jpg

Daniel Dennett profile in today’s Guardian

“He’s famous among philosophers as an extreme proponent of robot consciousness, who will argue that even thermostats have beliefs about the world. This argument turns out to be more about what constitutes our own beliefs than about the inner life of a thermostat. Part of this is because he uses the term “opinions” for the kind of conscious and considered ideas about the world that many people would mean by beliefs. He doesn’t think a thermostat is conscious. But he thinks its behaviour embodies assumptions about the world, and these can’t be distinguished, in their effects on the world, from beliefs: “Intentional systems have beliefs, or as-good-as beliefs. I use the word beliefs for the intentional states of all of them, including the notorious thermostat. But we have opinions as well as beliefs.”

Hippo campus rock

Prompted by conversations last night with Marko about Steely Dan, I listened to some this morning on the way into work, and my state of ‘zeitgeist distance’ at the moment was elegantly reflected back to me all the way from 1972.

You been tellin’ me you’re a genius
Since you were seventeen
In all the time I’ve known you
I still don’t know what you mean
The weekend at the college
Didn’t turn out like you planned
The things that pass for knowledge
I can’t understand

College, knowledge, campus, hippos… Had a great, though brief, conversation last night with Sanjay Khanna about the importance of forgetting, which led me to dig out some wikipedia stuff on the brain.

From the entry on the hippocampus:

“There is some controversy in psychology and the neurosciences about the precise role of the hippocampus, but it is generally agreed that it is essential for the formation of new memories about personally experienced events (episodic or autobiographical memory). Some researchers prefer to think of the hippocampus as part of a larger medial temporal lobe memory system responsible for general declarative memory (memories which can be explicitly verbalized – these would include e.g., memory for facts in addition to episiodic memory).

There is some evidence that, although these forms of memory often last a lifetime, the hippocampus ceases to be crucial for the retention of the memory after a period of consolidation. Damage to the hippocampus usually results in profound difficulties in forming new memories (anterograde amnesia), and normally also affects access to memories prior to the damage (retrograde amnesia). Although the retrograde effect normally extends some years prior to the brain damage, in some cases older memories are spared – it is this sparing of older memories which leads to the idea that consolidation over time involves the transfer of memories out of the hippocampus to other parts of the brain.”

When Nokia announced Lifeblog, Anne Galloway juxtaposed it against the idea of “forgetting machines”. If our life recording devices are ‘outboard-hippocampi’ then perhaps balance and consolidation processes are the natural progressions.

Hopefully Anne will reveal more about her “forgetting machine” in due course.

One other gem for the psychogeographically-inclined from the wikipedia entry on the hippocampus:

“The hippocampus is believed to be particularly important for finding shortcuts and new routes between familiar places. Some people are better at this than others, and brain imaging shows that these individuals have more active hippocampi when navigating.

London’s taxi drivers are required to learn a large number of places — and know the most direct routes between them (they have to pass a strict test, the Knowledge, before being licensed to drive the famous black cabs). One study showed that part of the hippocampus is larger in taxi drivers than in the general public, and that more experienced drivers have bigger hippocampi. It may be that having a bigger hippocampus helps you to become a cab driver. It also seems that finding shortcuts for a living may make your hippocampus grow.”

How one gets an MRI scanner in the back of a Black Cab is anyone’s guess.